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PAVING THE LEGAL PATH FOR CARBON
SEQUESTRATION FROM COAL
VICTOR B. FLATT†
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the many environmental and natural resource challenges that
face President Obama, a large one has received scant attention from
environmental scholars: coal. In the environmental community,
coal—dirty, polluting coal—is more of an epithet than a resource. It
has been the bane of environmentalists since the early days of the
1
Clean Air Act, and its reputation has only gotten worse with the
recognition that carbon dioxide (CO2), a major cause of climate
change, is produced by coal at a higher ratio per energy output than
other fossil fuels.2 Many environmental organizations propose
3
However, coal
eliminating coal entirely from our energy mix.
represents forty-nine percent of the Unites States’ existing electricgenerating capacity, and will likely remain an important source of
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1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000).
2. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981);
David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air, the Duty of Care in Climate Change
Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1779 n.145 (2007) (citations omitted).
3. Greenpeace, Project Hotseat: Dangerous Distractions, http://us.greenpeace.org/site/
PageNavigator/hotseat/PHS_Dangerous_Distractions (last visited Mar. 16, 2009); Sierra Club,
Stopping the Coal Rush, http://www.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/coal/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2009).
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energy in the near and intermediate term.4 Even more importantly,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that
fossil fuels (primarily coal) will dominate world energy until at least
the middle of the next century.5 Of particular concern is the fact that
China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs),6
depends heavily on coal-fired generation, and has relatively more coal
than other energy sources to exploit in its continued meteoric
growth.7
Additionally, in the absence of federal policy on controlling
GHGs, much uncertainty surrounds whether and to what extent coalfired generation can be permitted at all. There have been many
instances of state utility regulators, legislators, and governors vetoing
the permitting of new coal-fired electricity generating facilities;8 and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appeals board recently
denied a permit for a new coal-fired plant because the permitting
region, Region 8, had not set out a reasoned opinion on whether CO2
9
is a “pollutant subject to regulation” under the Clean Air Act. While
these rejections of coal-fired power may be appropriate responses to
the linkage between coal-fired power and GHG production, without
being a part of a larger energy plan, they may lead to energy
shortages and other unintended consequences. According to the
International Energy Agency’s 2008 Energy Technology Perspectives
Executive Summary, coal will continue to be part of a future energy
mix, and carbon capture and storage will generate approximately
nineteen percent of the GHG reductions necessary to stabilize

4. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2007, at 2
(2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf.
5. Edward Rubin et al., Technical Summary, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE SPECIAL REPORT, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 20 (2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_technicalsummary.pdf [hereinafter
IPCC, CARBON CAPTURE REPORT].
6. Patricia Ross McCubbin, China and Climate Change: Domestic Environmental Needs,
Differentiated International Responsibilities, and Rule of Law Weaknesses, 3 U. HOUST. ENVTL.
& ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 200, 201 (2009).
7. Edward H. Ziegler, China’s Cities, Globalization, and Sustainable Development:
Comparative Thoughts on Urban Planning, Energy, and Environmental Policy, 5 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 295, 300 (2006).
8. Felicity Barringer, States’ Battles Over Energy Grow Fiercer With U.S. in a Policy
Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A18.
9. In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00, PSD Appeal
No. 07-03, slip op. at 9–10 (E.A.B. Nov. 13, 2008) (order denying review in part and remanding
in part), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/EAB_WEB_Docket.nsf/Filings%20By%
20Appeal%20Number/C8C5985967D8096E85257500006811A7/$File/Remand...39.pdf.
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atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide at 450 parts per million
(ppm).10
Therefore, it will be imperative for President Obama to figure
out what role coal will play in our nation’s future energy mix, and
what role coal will have in other countries, since coal will continue to
impact worldwide emissions of GHGs. Given the “Scylla” of
increasing GHGs and the “Charybdis”11 of the need to replace almost
half of the United States’ and the world’s energy production if coal is
banned, it is imperative that the United States move toward either
reducing coal usage as quickly as possible around the world by
ramping up other cost-effective energy sources, or figuring out a way
to continue to produce coal-based electric power while drastically
reducing GHG emissions.
The option that has received the most attention is the latter,
particularly in finding a way to sequester the carbon dioxide produced
by coal-fired emissions and prevent it from entering the atmosphere
and contributing to increasing GHGs. This process, referred to as
carbon capture and storage (CCS), can potentially remove eighty to
ninety-five percent of the CO2 emitted from electric power plants.12
Though CO2 is routinely injected underground to aid in recovery of
oil, and though large-scale underground sequestration sites have been
13
identified in the United States, there is not yet a commercial-scale
CO2 sequestration facility attached to a large coal-fired power plant.14
Therefore, most of the research on this issue has focused on the
15
technical and economic difficulties of cost effective CCS. While this

10. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES IN SUPPORT OF THE
G8 PLAN OF ACTION 5 fig.ES.2 (2008),
available at www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ETP2008SUM.pdf.
11. Scylla and Charybdis are monsters of the Sicilian Sea in classical mythology, with one
on one side and one on the other, creating a difficult path through which to navigate. THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 519 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed. 1911).
12. PAUL W. PARFORMAK & PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CARBON
DIOXIDE (CO2) PIPELINES FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION: EMERGING POLICY ISSUES 1 (2007),
available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07May/RL33971.pdf.
13. See NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION
ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2008), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/
technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/atlasII/atlasII.pdf.
14. Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479, 1501–02 (2008).
15. A Google “web scholar” search on December 9, 2008, revealed about 7000 scholarly
articles on the economic and technological feasibility of large-scale carbon sequestration, and
2150 articles for a similar search for legal and regulatory feasibility of large-scale carbon
sequestration.
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is obviously necessary to deploy CCS effectively, there are also legal
issues that must be addressed to facilitate the adoption of CCS as a
16
viable technology. These legal issues have received less attention.
The most important focus on the regulatory and legal issues to date
has come from the work of the Advance Coal Technology Work
Group, convened by the EPA.17 This has culminated in a proposed
rule by the EPA to regulate CO2 sequestration through the
Underground Injection Permit program of the Safe Drinking Water
18
Act.
In addition, as of 2005, fourteen states have enacted state carbon
19
sequestration legislation, with numerous other proposals pending.
Coal-fired power plants are also regulated by the Federal Electric
Regulatory Commission (FERC), and by various state Public Utility
Commissions.20 While the EPA’s proposed rule and some of the
states’ legislation may be a stop-gap way to address CO2
sequestration, there are many issues, including state and federal
regulatory overlap, ownership, and liability, that would be more
effectively addressed through new comprehensive federal
legislation.21 If President Obama wishes to accelerate the bringing to
market of CCS for use in the United States and other parts of the
world, he must focus on legislation that can legally pave the way.
This legislation should address licensing of sequestration and electricgenerating facilities, ownership and property law, liability,

16. One notable exception is Alexandra Klass & Elizabeth Wilson, Climate Change and
Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-term Storage of Carbon Dioxide,
58 EMORY L.J. 103, 107 (2008) (exploring liability issues with respect to adequately protecting
the public).
17. See ADVANCED COAL TECH. WORK GROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech/2008_01_final_report.pdf
[hereinafter COAL FINAL REPORT].
18. Proposed Federal Requirements under the Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,610
(proposed Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146).
19. MELISSA CHAN & SARAH FORBES, CARBON SEQUESTRATION ROLE IN STATE AND
LOCAL ACTIONS 6–7 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/energyanalyses/pubs/
slfinal_1.pdf.
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2000); see also LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 32 (6th ed. 1985).
21. In its Report to Congress: Framework for Geological Carbon Sequestration on Public
Land, the U.S. Department of the Interior recently concluded that existing federal and state
legislation is sufficient to handle the sequestration of CO2 on public lands. U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGICAL CARBON SEQUESTRATION
ON PUBLIC LAND 13–14 (2009). Nevertheless, the report noted the complexity and possible
legal confusion concerning issues of liability, pore space, and transport. Id. at 1–2, 13–15.
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applicability and possible preemption of federal and state
environmental laws, and ancillary issues such as pipeline construction
and permitting, and the special case of offshore sequestration. The
legislation should also clarify jurisdictional terms, such as “geologic
sequestration” and “storage facility.” Building on work done by the
Program for Interagency Environmental Cooperation at the
University of Houston,22 this article explores some of the major legal
issues affecting CCS and proposes policies to address them.
Due to their importance, this article particularly focuses on the
need to address jurisdiction (what is CCS and how it should be
permitted), liability (who is responsible for any harm), and property
rights (who owns the various pieces of a CCS system). This article
concludes with other areas that should be addressed in detail by
future scholars.
Neither this article nor the work of the Program for Interagency
Environmental Cooperation necessarily gives the “best” answer to
addressing legal and regulatory barriers, but they do give some
answers and focus to the problem.
II. JURISDICTION
One of the most critical concerns in regulatory barriers to CCS
deployment is clarifying what qualifies as CCS and, therefore, what
CCS legislation should address. Additionally, choices must be made
as to how such legislation should be implemented. Specifically,
legislation must address whether the federal government or the states
should primarily regulate CCS, and what regulatory agency should be
assigned, or created, to oversee comprehensive CCS.
A. Definitions
Clearly defining what constitutes CCS, and thus what is to be
regulated, is the first jurisdictional step. Carbon dioxide must be
defined in terms of purity. In other words, what kind of a gas stream
should be sequestered? While pipelines and geologic formations may
be able to contain CO2, they may be less able to contain other air
pollutants or toxics.23 Additionally, the term “geologic sequestration”
22. See University of Houston Law Center, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources
Center, http://www.law.uh.edu/eenrcenter/Interagency.html (last visited May 19, 2009). For
more information regarding the Program for Interagency Environmental Cooperation’s
proposed draft of comprehensive legislation for CCS, see www.law.uh.edu/EENRCenter.
23. See Press Release, PR Newswire, Oxyfuel Technology Solutions for Carbon Capture
Presented by Air Products at Greenhouse Gas International Conference (Nov. 19, 2008)
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must be defined. What constitutes successful sequestration in terms
of purity and years stored?24 Legislation should make this clear. For
instance, the term could be defined as “underground storage in a
reservoir for at least 1000 years of at least 90% of the carbon dioxide
emitted from a capture facility, with a storage failure rate of no more
25
than 1% volume loss in 1000 years.” Additional terms that should
be defined include “capture facility,” “carbon dioxide pipelines,”
“injection,” “reservoir,” “site,” and “storage facility,” as well as words
that may need their meaning clarified in this context, such as
“operator,” “Indian Tribe,” or “State.”
B. Federal Preemption
There are significant limits on the availability of sites for carbon
sequestration. These limitations include both physical constraints on
available sites and social constraints on sites based on public
opposition.26 Geologic sequestration is accomplished by injecting CO2
into encapsulated, porous, geological formations.27 Porous geological
formations that hold, or have previously held, fluids such as natural
28
gas, oil, or brines are potential candidates for CO2 storage. Saline
aquifers and formations, as well as un-minable coal seams, are also
29
possible sequestration locations. While acceptable formations are
often found near areas also appropriate for coal-fired power
generation, this is not universally true. The net effect is that there are
only limited potential sites appropriate for CO2 geologic
sequestration facilities.30

(discussing technologies to purify a captured carbon dioxide stream), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=EMAGRCY.story&STORY=/www/story/
11-19-2008/0004929254&EDATE=WED+Nov+19+2008,+01:52+PM.
24. The Department of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory assumes that
sequestration should be “permanent.” See Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Carbon Sequestration,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
25. THE PROGRAM TO FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ENVTL. COOPERATION, PROPOSED
CARBON GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION LEGISLATION 4 (2008), available at http://
www.law.uh.edu/EENRcenter/documents/CCSProposedLegislation.pdf.
26. See generally IPCC, CARBON CAPTURE REPORT, supra note 5, at 33–34, 36 (estimating
the storage capacity for several geologic storage options and noting that the public tends to view
CCS less favorably than other climate change mitigation options).
27. See id. at 31.
28. Id.
29. Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2
Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 454 (2007).
30. See NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 13.
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One possibility for increasing the viable sites for carbon geologic
sequestration facilities is to create a new infrastructure, or add to the
existing infrastructure, for moving CO2. Transporting captured CO2
in small quantities is possible by truck, rail, or ship; however, largescale CO2 sequestration may require a dedicated interstate CO2
pipeline network, which simply does not exist at this time.31 A recent
Congressional Research Report on CO2 pipelines concluded that
developing an “expansive national CO2 pipeline network . . . could
32
pose numerous new regulatory and economic challenges.” Although
CO2 pipeline technology has been employed historically to transport
CO2 for oilfield recovery and CO2 pipelines operate much the same
way as natural gas pipelines, only 5800 kilometers of CO2 pipeline is
currently in operation in the United States.33 This relatively small
regional network is inadequate for massive transportation of CO2 to
distant geologic sequestration locations. Pipelines of the future may
gather CO2 from widespread sources and transport it to a central
location for sequestration.
However, regulatory uncertainties
regarding pipeline authority, as well as the difficulties of securing
owners’ right of way, combined with the expense and difficulty of
creating an extensive CO2 pipeline network, render it unlikely that
full-scale reliance on CO2 transport through an interstate pipeline
network will be an option until well into the future. In the meantime,
it seems likely that most CO2 sequestration will take place very near
34
the point at which CO2 is captured, limiting location options.
The promotion of sequestration also requires the permitting of
new coal-fired power plants and plants that have access to suitable
storage sites. Permitting of a power plant typically requires approval
from the entities that regulate utilities, which are normally equivalent
to public utility commissions, and may also require a “necessity”
35
determination and local environmental review. Additional review
occurs at the federal level, including environmental review, and the
36
FERC’s analysis of market power and monopolistic behavior.
31. PARFORMAK & FOLGER, supra note 12, at 1.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 4–5.
34. See id. at 6 (concluding that seventy-seven percent of the total annual CO2 captured
from the major North American sources will likely be stored directly below the sources, and
that an additional eighteen percent may be stored within 100 miles of the source).
35. Jeffrey S. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Energy Restructuring, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 43 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 615, 630 (2003).
36. Victor B. Flatt, What is the Best Formula to Protect the Environment in Electricity
Restructuring?, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 221, 226 (2005); Mark N. Cooper, The
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Carbon dioxide pipeline permitting similarly requires approval from
whatever state and federal entities regulate that type of pipeline
approval, as well as environmental, antitrust, and workplace safety
approval.37
Due to greater concern over climate change, coal-fired power
plants have faced significant opposition in recent years, with very few
38
Thus, it is imperative to
obtaining approval at the state level.
streamline the approval process for appropriately designed coal-fired
generating facilities that incorporate capture and sequestration
technology. Recent experience suggests that even with advanced
capture and sequestration technology incorporated into the coal-fired
power plant designs, approval in appropriate locations will be difficult
due to overlapping jurisdictions, lack of public awareness of CCS
technology, and residual suspicion that CCS will not mitigate the
climate change effects of coal fired power plants.39
Each entity that has jurisdiction over CCS may have a way to
veto a CCS project for reasons unrelated to the original purpose of
the legal regime being used, such as necessity, safety, or the
environment. Thus, one federal agency, most likely the EPA, should
be placed in charge of the permitting of all aspects of CCS. Federal
control will eliminate the current system of overlapping and
potentially conflicting requirements for CO2 sequestration facilities.
There is precedent for federal preemption of state site
restrictions regarding the geologic storage of CO2. Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) terminals allow for the transport and importation of

Failure of Federal Authorities to Protect American Energy Consumers from Market Power and
Other Abusive Practices, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 315, 393 (2007).
37. Currently, non-natural gas interstate pipelines are regulated for safety and siting by the
Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMA), and
intrastate pipelines are regulated for safety and pricing by either public utility commissions or
state mining commissions, depending on the eventual use of the carbon dioxide in question
(though they may follow certain policies of the PHMA). Depending on where a CCS facility
was sited, the utility could require overlapping state and federal approval for pipeline safety,
siting, and carrier pricing. Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, From EOR to CCS: The
Evolving Legal and Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 29 ENERGY L.J.
421, 449–50 (2008).
38. Judy Pasternak, Coal at Heart of Climate Battle: Environmental Groups Go to Court to
Stop Each New Power Plant and Force Washington to Address the Issue, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2008, at A1.
39. See Greg Edwards, Proposed Coal Plant Denied: Virginia Regulators Say Proposal
Neither Reasonable Nor Prudent, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 2008, at B9 (reporting
that the Virginia Corporation Commission denied approval for new power plant using coal
gasification technology).
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natural gas in concentrated liquid formation.40 Gas in liquefied form
can be transported to places that are not connected by a pipeline so
41
that it is not “stranded” in a low-demand market. However, LNG
terminals are controversial and many communities have sought to
exclude them entirely, despite the benefits.42 This sentiment has
created what lawmakers deem to be unacceptable barriers to the
43
expansion of on-shore LNG terminal capacity. Local and state land
use and zoning restrictions were often utilized to resist LNG terminal
44
sites. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 sought to reduce these barriers
by modifying the siting process for LNG facilities and preempting
local and state siting barriers by declaring that exclusive authority to
site LNG facilities rested with the federal government:
The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve or
deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or
operation of an LNG terminal. Except as specifically provided in
this chapter, nothing in this chapter is intended to affect otherwise
applicable law related to any Federal agency’s authorities or
45
responsibilities related to LNG terminals.

This provision has been upheld as a proper exercise of federal power
46
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
While this preemption of local authority for siting was initially
opposed by environmentalists, closer examination reveals that such
preemption may be necessary to increase needed public infrastructure
efficiently, without creating unequal burdens on so-called
47
“environmental justice” communities.
Obviously, such preemption (for either LNG or CO2
sequestration facilities) must be grounded in the notion that the
operation of such facilities does not create unacceptable health and
safety risks in communities with such sites.
Therefore, any

40. Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 57 n.55 (2008).
41. Josh Lute, LNG Terminals: Future or Folly, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 621, 630 (2007).
42. See Eileen Gauna, LNG Facility Siting and Environmental (In)Justice: Is it Time for a
National Siting Scheme?, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 98–101 (2007).
43. Angela J. Durbin, Comment, Striking a Delicate Balance: Developing a New Rationale
for Preemption While Protecting the Public’s Role in Siting Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, 56
EMORY L.J. 507, 509 (2006).
44. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 176 (2005).
45. Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 311, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (Supp. 2006).
46. AES Sparrows Point LNG, L.L.C. v. Smith, 470 F. Supp. 2d 586, 589 (D. Md. 2007)
(striking down a zoning ordinance on LNG siting).
47. Gauna, supra note 42, at 106.
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preemptive legislation must be explicit about health, safety, and
environmental factors that must be met before any permit can be
granted, and ensure that existing health, safety, and environmental
policies are fully followed. Thus, federal legislation must create a
kind of permit system that addresses federal, state, and local
concerns.48
III. LIABILITY MANAGEMENT
One of the most formidable barriers facing potential CCS
operations is the possible liability costs of these operations. If the
costs of CCS outweigh the benefits, it should not go forward and,
generally, we rely on complex common law liability to send that
market signal.49 However, liability is much more uncertain here,
where economic signals do not operate efficiently. Even though
studies indicate that the benefits of large-scale CCS operations should
be substantial and bring little risk of harm to humans or the
50
environment, differing liability rules and regulations exist, creating
an uncertainty that poses a problem in promoting CCS.51 CCS
operators need some assurance that liability costs will not outweigh
the benefit derived from implementing CCS operations. Without this
predictability, the threat of uncertain liability costs will likely deter a
large number of potential operators. Thus, it is necessary to create
and adopt a liability scheme that encourages private industry to
implement CCS operations, while protecting the public and the public
interest.
If liability issues are to be clarified by legislation, this legislation
would have to ensure that the purposes of liability—protecting public
health and safety, as well as property rights—are preserved.
Although unlikely, large surface releases could pose health risks to

48. Even when done in this manner, preemption always poses a risk to local environmental,
health, and safety protection. The federal government, even with legal requirements to protect
local health, environment, and safety, may not always adequately enforce these laws. To avoid
this problem, federal legislation should include a strong citizens’ suit provision for enforcement.
While this could also be used solely for delay purposes, the trade-off may be necessary to
protect the public’s interest.
49. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1985) (noting that relative fault models (negligence with comparative
negligent defense) are efficient).
50. See SARAH M. FORBES, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., REGULATORY BARRIERS FOR
CARBON CAPTURE, STORAGE AND SEQUESTRATION 1 (2002), available at http://
www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/reg-issues/capture.pdf.
51. Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 123.
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humans, such as asphyxiation or other effects caused by prolonged
exposure to high concentrations of CO2.52 Exposure to a 1% to 5%
atmospheric CO2 mixture can result in physical effects including
increased breathing; loss of consciousness usually occurs from
exposure to greater than 10% atmospheric CO2; and most CO2
concentrations above 30% are lethal.53 Furthermore, CO2 seepage
could harm flora and fauna and potentially ruin nearby ecosystems
and agriculture.54
With respect to property protection, it is important to account
for the nature of CO2 stored underground. Like water and oil, CO2 is
55
a “fugitive” substance. Thus, when CO2 is injected underground, it
will naturally migrate throughout the pore space.56 This natural
migration could lead CO2 to travel upward throughout the reservoir
into undetected or abandoned portions of the reservoir, or into
57
portions of the reservoir that are not owned by the operator. Even if
it remains underground, CO2 could cause saline intrusion into potable
aquifers, make sources of oil and gas unattainable, create pressure
58
changes causing ground heave, and even trigger seismic events.
Even if there were no direct physical harm or trespass, a CO2 release
would increase atmospheric CO2, which is a leading cause of climate
change. Thus, any liability scheme must also ensure that public
health and private property rights will be protected and that any
harms will be compensated.
This article is not the first to explore the problems that potential
liability may pose for the deployment of large-scale CCS. The issue
was identified by the Advanced Coal Technology Work Group as a
major issue for deployment, and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
Commission (IOGCC) has proposed releasing operators from long59
Mark Anthony de Figueredo analyzed
term liability for CCS.

52. Id. at 118.
53. See FORBES, supra note 50, at 5 (noting the 1986 disaster when CO2 released from a
natural reservoir under Lake Nyos in Africa killed more than 1700 people).
54. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 119.
55. See Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
56. See Mark Anthony de Figueiredo, The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage 55 (Jan. 12,
2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at
http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/Mark_de_Figueiredo_PhD_Dissertation.pdf.
57. Id.; Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 115–16, 118.
58. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 119.
59. See COAL FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 3–4; IOGCC TASK FORCE ON CARBON
CAPTURE AND GEOLOGIC STORAGE, STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC
STRUCTURES: A LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDE FOR STATES AND PROVINCES 11 (2007),
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property rights and liability in his Ph.D. dissertation at MIT,60 and
Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have explored liability options
for CCS in their article, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration:
Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon
Dioxide.61 Both pieces provide extensive and excellent detail on
liability options and issues. This article treads similar ground and
agrees and disagrees with some proposals mentioned in the pieces.
However, this article focuses more particularly on the economic
barriers to deployment due to liability faced by proponents of CCS.
Although I agree that the patchwork of liability provisions must also
be resolved to ensure protection of the public, I do not delve into this
with the detail addressed by Klass and Wilson.
A. Current Liability Schemes That Might Apply without Legislative
Changes
There are four general causes of action that may arise in the
event of a CO2 release. These claims contain similar elements, but
some claims may be better suited for particular sets of facts. In
addition, there exists the possibility of claims of harm arising from
climate change.
1. Negligence
The most likely cause of action would be a general negligence
62
claim that could cover a wide variety of harms. A negligence claim
could be used to address harm to human and environmental health,
63
and to property. In order to prove a negligence claim, a plaintiff
would have to prove four elements: duty, breach, causation, and
damages. The plaintiff would have to show that the operator had a
duty of care over the CCS operation, that the operator breached that
duty, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by that breach.64
Damages could be in the form of either property damage or damage
65
to plaintiff’s health.
available
at
http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/co2/IOGCC%20Master%20CO2
%20Regulatory%20Document%209-2007.pdf [hereinafter IOGCC TASK FORCE].
60. De Figueiredo, supra note 56.
61. Klass & Wilson, supra note 16.
62. See Melanie R. Kay, Environmental Negligence: A Proposal for a New Cause of Action
for the Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contaminated Land, 94 CAL. L. REV. 149, 168–69 (2006).
63. See de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 56.
64. See Kay, supra note 62, at 170 (quoting Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 334, 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
65. See de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 55.
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2. Trespass
Another claim could be a trespass claim.
As discussed
66
previously, CO2 will naturally migrate throughout any reservoir.
This could lead to the CO2 migrating into pore space that is not
owned by the operator, giving rise to a trespass cause of action. The
plaintiff owner would need to show that the unauthorized entry of the
CO2 into her property prevented her from making use of that pore
67
space. The remedy for trespass is usually an injunction, payment for
the loss of property value, and/or costs of restoration.68
3. Nuisance
Another possible cause of action is nuisance. The difference
between a nuisance claim and a trespass claim is that a nuisance claim
arises from an interference in the enjoyment of one’s property, while
a trespass claim arises from an invasion of one’s property.69 Damages
70
for nuisance and trespass are virtually identical.
4. Strict Liability
Another possible claim could be a strict liability claim. Strict
liability claims are reserved for abnormally dangerous activities under
sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.71 Under
strict liability, an operator can be found liable even if she used “all
possible preventive measures.”72
5. Climate Change
The purpose of CCS operations is to reduce the amount of CO2
emitted into the atmosphere, as GHG emissions are the primary
73
cause of atmospheric warming. Thus, one other perceived harm that
could arise from CCS operations is that a major release of CO2 would
contribute to climate change. While damage from climate change

66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 56; G. Nelson Smith, III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental
Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 54
(1995).
70. See de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 56.
71. Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 141–42.
72. De Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 58.
73. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2007).
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harm is a somewhat novel legal concept, it is a possible uncertainty in
CCS.
B. What Should Comprehensive Legislation Look Like?
Liability regulation in comprehensive legislation should be
limited to physical harm to humans, animals, and plant life. Because
property issues from migration would be similar to existing migratory
issues for natural gas, which are currently handled under state law,
claims of property damage in the form of trespass and nuisance
should probably be left to state law (though consistency at the state
level would be important in this area).
With respect to a possible federal liability scheme for health and
environmental damages, some statutory plan based on requiring
“reasonable” behavior should be adopted. A strict liability regime
should not be adopted for CCS operations, in that it would greatly
increase the risk of liability costs for CCS operators without
commensurate benefit to the public.
If operators take on the burden of implementing CCS
operations, they should not also be held liable for climate change
claims. If liability could be imposed on CCS operators for a CO2
release that did not cause any harm other than increasing atmospheric
CO2 levels, an unlikely occurrence given the correct initial standard,
this scheme would fail to reach the goal of encouraging
implementation of CCS. The climate change protections should be
specified and set out in the original standard.
It seems
counterproductive to impose climate change liability on operators
who have undertaken demonstrated efforts to reduce harm from CO2
emissions, and who have also complied with government mandated
standards designed to avoid such harm. If operators are held liable
for their contribution to climate change because of a CO2 release,
they will have much less incentive to implement CCS.
What federal statutory schemes would work? There are several
options.
1. Insurance
The most commonly used method for managing liability is
insurance. Insurance serves three related, but separate, functions.
First, insurance transfers risk from parties who are comparatively
risk averse to enterprises more willing to bear risk. Second,
insurance spreads risk by combining individual risks [into a general
pool]. . . . Third, insurance performs a risk-allocation function by
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charging premiums that reflect the level of risk posed by each
74
individual . . . that is insured.

Essential to setting proper premium prices and setting aside the
proper funds in case of an accident for CCS is knowledge of the likely
frequency and severity of a CCS disaster. Because CCS is a very new
technology and there has been no real opportunity to assess the
frequency and severity of CCS events, CCS is not well suited, at least
at this point, for actuarial models.75 If private insurance companies
set premium prices too low, they may be unable to cover the damages
that stem from a CCS accident. On the other hand, if insurance
companies set premiums too high, this could deter possible operators,
who would otherwise provide a cost effective benefit, from entering
into the CCS business. Without a working knowledge of the
frequency and/or severity of CCS accidents, a private insurance
scheme, standing alone, would be little more than guesswork and
probably would not adequately reach both the goals of encouraging
private industry to implement CCS while protecting public health and
welfare.
2. Liability Cap
Another liability scheme that has worked in other areas is a
liability cap. The Price-Anderson Act,76 adopted in 1957, regulates
liability for the nuclear power industry in the United States. This act
allows for a limited liability shield, in that each nuclear plant operator
must obtain primary insurance coverage up to $300 million.77 In the
event that damages from a nuclear accident were to exceed the
primary insurance coverage, recovery could be sought from a
secondary insurance source, for which each nuclear operator would
“contribute up to $95.8 million per unit[,] . . . payable in annual
installments of $15 million or less.”78 If the damages of a nuclear
accident were ever to exceed both the primary and secondary
insurance coverage, the nuclear operators would be shielded from any
amount over the secondary coverage, and the federal government
79
would take on the remaining liability.
74. E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 945–46 (1988).
75. See id. at 960; de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 62.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
77. 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) (2008).
78. AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 2
(2005), available at http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2000).
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3. Liability Shield
Another possible scheme would be to grant a complete liability
shield under other statutes to all CCS operators that have followed
certain safety rules and regulations as set out by the appropriate
80
federal agency. Under this scheme, as long as the operator followed
all CCS safety regulations, a rough equivalency to “acting
reasonably,” the operator could be completely exempt from all claims
arising under other statutes.81 This scheme would encourage private
industry to implement CCS technology by removing the liability costs
associated with CCS. This scheme, however, would deprive possible
victims of necessary compensation unless the federal government
agreed to take on the liability that would have been borne by the CCS
operators. Furthermore, even if the federal government agreed to
assume this liability, it may not adequately protect the public welfare,
as CCS operators would have less incentive to follow the
aforementioned safe practices in implementing CCS. Thus, while a
partial liability shield may be plausible with the federal government
making the claimant whole, a complete liability shield would not be
the best method to reach the twofold goal of encouraging private
investment and adequately protecting human and environmental
health.
4. Bonding
Another possibility is bonding. Typically, the operator or a third
party would post the bond as a promise of compliance with federal
regulations.82 The bond would then be released back to the original
payor when its promise of compliance was fulfilled.83 The main issue
in this context would be the length of time that the operator would be
84
required to comply before his promise would be deemed fulfilled. If
compliance was incomplete or insufficient, the bond would be
forfeited and used to finance any claims arising from these

80. This scheme has been used in other environmental statutes, namely CERCLA. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607(j) (2000).
81. The language used to avoid imposing CERCLA liability on those who have met other
statutory mandates is: “Recovery by any person (including the United States or any State or
Indian tribe) for response costs or damages resulting from a federally permitted release shall be
pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section.” Id.
82. DAVID GERARD & ELIZABETH J. WILSON, ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS AND THE
PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM CARBON SEQUESTRATION 2 (2006), available at
www.ecy.wa.gov/laws-rules/wac173407_218/Gerard%20Wilson%20Bonding.pdf.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 14–15.
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operations.85 Bonding has been used as a liability measure in coal
mining and hard-rock mining projects.86
Bonding is less favorable to private investment than a partial
liability shield because the bond shifts the injured party’s burden of
proof from proving that the operator was harmed to proving that
compliance criteria were met.87 At the same time, the public sector is
only protected up to the amount of the bond posted—not necessarily
88
for the full amount of potential damages. However, if the operator
remains solvent after forfeiting its bond, harmed parties may seek
additional remedies through the court system.89
5. Compensation Fund
The final possibility would be to establish a compensation fund.
In this scheme, those that create the risk, the CCS operators, would
make payments into a fund that would be used to address any harm
90
The compensation fund would be
caused by CCS operations.
beneficial to injured parties in that the injured parties would not
necessarily have to trace their injury to a specific operator. Instead,
they would only need to show that their injuries resulted from the
negligence of any CCS operator in order to be awarded damages
from the fund.
Under this scheme, one major issue would be determining how
much each operator should contribute to the fund. Payment could be
based on several factors, including amount of CO2 stored, the
injection site’s proximity to population centers, and the physical
characteristics of the reservoir.91
For several policy reasons, comprehensive CCS legislation
should probably adopt this strategy. Under a compensation fund
scheme, the federal government could collect fees from CCS
operators to provide funding for injuries resulting from the release of
CO2. Any uncertainty with respect to total risk would then be borne
by the government, rather than the CCS operator. The legislation
would have to address three major issues in designing an appropriate
compensation fund: (1) the method of financing the fund, (2) the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3 n.6.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
De Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 70.
Id. at 71.
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events that are compensable, and (3) the amount of compensation
awarded to each injured party.92
With respect to financing, one possibility would be to consider
the amount of CO2 stored—for instance, the more you inject, the
93
more you pay. Another possibility is a risk-based contribution.
Under this model, each operator’s contribution to the fund would be
determined by: (1) an analysis of the severity of damages that a CO2
release would cause based on the amount of CO2 stored and its
proximity to populations centers, and (2) consideration of the
likelihood of a CO2 leak based on the physical characteristics of the
reservoir. De Figueiredo proposes this type of scheme, wherein the
operator of the site pays a different amount based on the risk of
leakage and failure.94
While the risk-based model may seem to be the most fair and
would most closely align incentives, it faces particular problems in
this context. First, it requires extensive scientific analysis and
calculation, making administration more costly and difficult. Though
de Figueiredo assumes that such calculations can be done,95 risk
analysis over CCS time periods becomes even more difficult. Such
difficulty in administration may not even provide much more in the
way of incentives to operators. It should be noted that every injection
site will be subject to the same regulations and safety standards.
Thus, using the likelihood of a release as a factor in determining each
operator’s contribution could be a redundant exercise in risk
evaluation. If every site is subject to the same safety standards, then
the amount of CO2 stored, a determination easily made
administratively, could be the basis of each operator’s contribution.
In other words, operators that stored similar volumes of CO2 would
pay the same amount to the fund, regardless of physical
characteristics and proximity to population centers.
While this option may prove to be more efficient from an
administrative point of view, it would not encourage the use of the
most safe injection sites. It is possible that proximity to population
centers could also be converted into a formula for ease of
administration. In an effort to establish a contribution model that
accurately reflects the risk imposed by each operator, contributions
92. Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of
Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 886 (1987).
93. See id. at 890.
94. De Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 399.
95. Id.
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should be based on the amount of CO2 injected with an additional
risk analysis related to proximity to an affected population. With
CO2, due to its quick dispersal, this would be a much smaller factor
than trying to calculate effects of toxic release on the public.
With respect to determining which events are compensable and
what the amounts should be, this should probably be designated to
regulatory discretion. The types of injuries that could possibly occur
are not completely understood, and thus we cannot understand
necessary compensation either. The EPA has particular expertise in
determining environmental safety risks and has specifically addressed
96
Thus, based on sound
the effects of CO2 on human health.
environmental and actuarial science, both determinations should be
delegated to the EPA.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS
The injection of carbon dioxide into geologic formations is not
new; it has been used for decades in enhanced oil recovery
97
operations. However, because of the vast quantities of CO2 that will
be injected and the long-term storage that is required, CCS
technology faces several novel challenges, particularly in the area of
subsurface property rights.98
A. Ownership Issues Related to CCS Technology
Geologic storage of immense amounts of carbon dioxide for
hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of years presents very complex
property issues. Carbon dioxide can be sequestered in a number of
different geologic formations, including depleted oil and gas
reservoirs, saline aquifers, coal seams, and deep sub-seabed
99
formations. The geologic formation subject to injection will dictate
the property rights that are implicated. MIT’s recent study on the
Future of Coal notes that “[b]ecause of their large storage potential
96. See OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CARBON DIOXIDE AS A
FIRE SUPPRESSANT: EXAMINING THE RISKS app. B (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (2007)
(setting forth OSHA regulations regarding human exposure to air contaminants, including
CO2).
97. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION
THROUGH OIL RECOVERY 1 (2008), available at www.netl.doe.gov/publications/factsheets/
program/Prog053.pdf.
98. See Elizabeth J. Wilson & Mark A. de Figueiredo, Geologic Carbon Dioxide
Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10114, 10116–18
(2006).
99. Id. at 10114.
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and broad distribution, it is likely that most geological sequestration
will occur in saline formations.”100 However, the study also concludes
that most initial carbon sequestration projects will likely utilize
depleted oil and gas reservoirs because of their availability, the
quality of existing subsurface data, and the potential for economic
101
return. Additionally, whether sequestration takes place on-shore or
off-shore further impacts the legal framework at issue.102 Finally,
because there is already legal precedent governing the injection of
carbon dioxide for enhanced oil recovery operations, if the CO2 were
initially injected for this purpose it is likely that it would be governed
by that body of law.103
1. Depleted Oil and Gas Reservoirs
The injection of carbon dioxide into oil and gas reservoirs
implicates a number of property interests, including surface owners,
mineral owners, lessees of solid minerals, oil and gas lessees, owners
of non-operating interests, owners of future interests, and the rights
104
In most of the world, subsurface
of adjacent property owners.
minerals and pore space is the property of the central government,
simplifying consideration of property issues for carbon
sequestration.105 However, in the United States, mineral rights and
subsurface pore space ownership on private land are commonly held
by private parties, adding great complexity to the property rights
equation.
The IOGCC Geologic Carbon Dioxide Sequestration Task Force
has “identified three working models that can provide technological
and regulatory guidance for [geologic storage]: (1) injection of CO2
into underground formations for enhanced oil recovery (EOR)
operations, (2) storage of natural gas in geologic reservoirs, and (3)
injection of acid gas into underground formations.”106 According to
the IOGCC Taskforce, the law governing short-term storage of
107
natural gas is the most useful for the consideration of CCS.
100. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBONCONSTRAINED WORLD 44 (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf.
101. Id.
102. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, PROSPECTS FOR CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE 190 (2004).
103. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10117–18.
104. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 15.
105. See INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, REGULATION OF CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE 13 (2008).
106. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 15.
107. See id. at 15–16.
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However, each of these legal paradigms should be examined because
each adds to the understanding of the complexity of the property
rights at issue.
a. Enhanced Oil Recovery Operations (EOR)
Through enhanced oil recovery operations, CO2 is injected into
an oil and gas reservoir in order to re-pressurize the reservoir and
increase oil and gas recovery (termed secondary and tertiary
recovery).108 EOR operations have raised a number of legal questions
regarding the operator’s liability to adjacent property owners. While
the operator has “the right to a fair share of the oil and gas in place
and a duty to protect the common source of supply[,]” physical
invasion of a neighboring mineral estate with a substance injected to
enhance recovery is forbidden.109 As a result, EOR operations will
generally only take place in a field that has been unitized.110 “With
‘field unitization,’ oil or gas field leases for resource development are
combined, thereby creating a field-wide operation; liability is
removed as a driving concern because production and profits are
shared by all unit members, and the field is managed in order to
optimize resource recovery.”111 In EOR operations that have not
been unitized, liability has been imposed on the operator for mineral
loss on the basis of trespass and nuisance.112
In the case of secondary recovery operations, the power of state
regulatory boards to grant permits for forced unitization has been
consistently upheld.113 The unitization method may be of particular
interest in the regulation of CCS given the uncertainty of where the
CO2 will travel once it is injected into a reservoir. For example, in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, the Alabama Supreme Court
reversed a finding of damages to a landowner’s reservoir that

108. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10118.
109. Id.
110. The use of field unitization in oil and gas operations is widespread. Only Texas, the
largest oil and gas producing state in the United States, does not have a compulsory unitization
law. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to Enron, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187, 187 (2004) (“Such a statute is universally recognized as
necessary to assure the maximum efficient recovery of oil and gas while also allocating fair
shares of a field’s bounty to the different operators of leases overlying a common reservoir.”).
111. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10118.
112. Id. Note that this is not the case in Texas under the “negative rule of capture”
established in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, in which the Texas Supreme Court
held that technical rules of trespass could not defeat a secondary recovery project. 361 S.W.2d
560, 574 (Tex. 1962).
113. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10118.
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bordered a unitized EOR project, holding that under Alabama law
the adjacent landowner could have petitioned for inclusion into the
114
In
unitized project in order to protect his underlying reservoir.
coming to this conclusion, the court stressed the importance of state
administrative power to create and protect unitization projects.
b. Hazardous Waste Injection
Underground injection wells dispose of about fifty percent of the
liquid hazardous waste produced in the United States; however, this
amount is very small compared to the enormous quantities of carbon
115
dioxide that will be stored in conjunction with CCS projects.
Leading case law in this area—premised on trespass, negligence, and
nuisance—affirms the liability of operators for the intrusion of
hazardous waste into the pore space of adjacent landowners.116
However, these cases limit the adjacent landowner’s likelihood of
recovery by placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff and holding
that claims for subsurface invasions “are only valid as long as the
invasions actually interfere with ‘reasonable and foreseeable’ use of
the subsurface.”117 In other words, the adjacent land owner must
show that its own mineral operations are actually impacted, or that an
expectation of profit from the use of pore space storage is impaired.
c. Natural Gas Storage
Natural gas is injected into shallow formations for temporary
storage to maintain reserves.118 The storage of natural gas in depleted
reservoirs is not entirely analogous to the storage of carbon dioxide,
as natural gas is generally stored for very short periods of time to
provide for increased demand in winter months.119 In addition,
because natural gas itself is a valuable commodity, unlike hazardous
wastes or CO2 in this context, ownership of the injected gas has also
been an issue. Thus, there are actually two separate issues to consider
114. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, 723 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1998)).
115. Id. at 10119.
116. Id. at 10119–20 (citing Mongrue v. Monsanto, 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001); Chance v.
BP Chem., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996)).
117. Id. at 10120.
118. Moore, supra note 29, at 461. Note that natural gas can also be stored in suitable salt
caverns and natural aquifers. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121.
119. Also, note that natural gas injection is exempt from regulation under the Underground
Injection Control (UIC) program. Moore, supra note 29, at 462. However, the EPA and U.S.
courts have held that CO2 is not a “natural gas” under the UIC program or the Safe Water
Drinking Act. Id. (citing Arco Oil & Gas Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 14 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
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when examining the law of natural gas storage: (1) the ownership of
the injected gas, and (2) the ownership of the associated pore space.
i. Ownership of the Injected Natural Gas
State law has held that the natural gas injected into underground
reservoirs remains the property of the injecting operator.120 This has
been found to be the case even where the injected natural gas
migrated to an adjacent property owner’s reservoir where the
operator had not obtained storage rights:121 “The storing party was
found to have retained ownership rights even though the gas had
migrated to production wells that were on the third party’s land not
within the designated storage area.”122
ii. Ownership of the Pore Space
The property law of each state will control ownership of the
depleted oil and gas reservoir pore space. There is no clear consensus
on whether the ownership of the pore space lies with the surface
estate or the mineral estate, and consideration of these rights varies
significantly from state to state.123 The two primary theories
governing pore space ownership are termed the American Rule and
the English Rule.
Under the American Rule, once subsurface minerals have been
removed from the pore space, the surface owner—and not the
mineral owner—retains the right to use the depleted space for
storage.124 In essence, the mineral estate owner only has the right to
the actual minerals, not to the reservoir containing those minerals.
This view has been adopted by a number of states, including
Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Michigan.125 However, a Michigan court
was careful to note that any oil or natural gas that remains in the pore
space can serve to preclude the surface owner from using the
reservoir for storage.126 Because certain amounts of oil and natural
gas typically remain in formations even after recovery operations are
completed, use of pore space for CCS may be complicated even in
states where ownership clearly lies with the surface owner. The
120. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121.
121. Id. (citing Natural Gas Co. v. Mahon & Rowsey, Inc., 786 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1986);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962)).
122. Id.
123. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 16–19.
124. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121.
125. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 17–18.
126. Id. (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Goike, 560 N.W.2d 365 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)).
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owner of the mineral estate (and of any leased, operating, or future
interests thereto) would retain an interest in the pore space for which
he would have to be compensated.
Conversely, under the English Rule, which is followed in much of
Canada as well as Kentucky, the mineral owner retains the rights to
127
the subsurface pore space even after all minerals are extracted.
Complicating matters further, there are a number of states where the
ownership of pore space has not been addressed or remains unsettled.
This is of particular concern in Texas, where there is no clear general
rule on pore space ownership unless it has been specified by
contract.128
Legal commentators have also failed to come to any consensus as
to the rightful ownership of pore space as between the mineral and
surface estates. In their article entitled Geologic Carbon Dioxide
Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, authors
Elizabeth J. Wilson and Mark A. de Figueiredo conclude that while a
majority of states adopt the view that the surface owner has rights to
the spent reservoir space, mineral owners often retain a valid interest,
so it is in the best interest of the entity who wishes to obtain rights to
129
In contrast,
the pore space to compensate all estate owners.
Williams and Meyers argue in their treatise on oil and gas law that the
mineral estate, as the dominant estate, should retain ownership of the
associated pore space, even after the minerals are depleted.130
2. Saline Formations
The property rights concerning saline aquifers are dependent on
a separate legal regime governing groundwater rights.131 Wilson and
de Figueiredo have explored this legal system extensively.132 While
there is a developed body of law on the use of depleted oil and gas
reservoirs for natural gas storage, there is virtually no case law on the
use of saline aquifers for storage and associated property rights.133
Rather, water law has focused on property rights concerning the use

127. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121; IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59,
at 18–19.
128. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 16.
129. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10123.
130. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 20 (citing PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M.
KRAMER, 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW § 222 (2006)).
131. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10117.
132. See Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98.
133. Id. at 10117.
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of groundwater for consumption.134 “In general, states follow one of
five major doctrines with respect to ownership of groundwater rights:
(1) absolute dominion, (2) reasonable use, (3) correlative rights, (4)
the [R]estatement rule, or (5) prior appropriation.”135
Pursuant to the absolute dominion rule, the owner of the surface
estate has “absolute dominion” over all resources on, above, or below
136
The “absolute
his property, including any underlying aquifer.
dominion” owner may make any use of the underlying aquifer
137
without risk of liability to an adjoining landowner.
The next three doctrines are all essentially variants of the
reasonable use rule. The reasonable use owner may also use
underlying groundwater without restriction, as long as that use is
138
reasonable and beneficial to the land itself. The correlative rights
rule is similar, except that owners over an aquifer are held to have
apportioned shares of the aquifer dependent upon the amount of
their land that overlies the resource.139 The Restatement rule, based
on section 858 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is very similar to
the reasonable use rule with the exception that it allows use of the
groundwater outside of the land overlying the aquifer.140 An owner
will be liable to adjacent property owners for unreasonable use that
harms the aquifer.141
Finally, under the prior appropriation rule, which is used
throughout most of the American West, the first person to make
beneficial use of a water source establishes precedence over its
continued use. However, some states have imposed a reasonable use
requirement on this doctrine.142

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Judith Royster, Indian Tribal Rights to Groundwater, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489,
499 (2006).
139. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable Water
Use: If There Are No “Natural Limits,” Should We Worry About Water Supplies?, 27 PUB. LAND
& RESOURCES L. REV. 33, 51 (2006).
140. R. Timothy Weston, Harmonizing Management of Ground and Surface Water Use
under Eastern Water Law Regimes, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 239, 252 (2008).
141. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10117.
142. Id.
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a. Condemnation and Compensation
Given the implications of subsurface trespass law outlined above,
establishing a reservoir for use in CCS will almost certainly require
the purchase of all property rights that could be impacted by the
project or the use of some sort of unitization process. The creation of
such a geologic storage unit could potentially take months or years of
negotiation, and some property interests will likely be adverse to use
of their pore space for storage at all. The solutions to these problems
are at least partially addressed by consideration of condemnation
under natural gas law.
The Natural Gas Act of 1938143 “provides for eminent domain for
the construction of interstate natural gas pipelines,” a power which
the courts have held extends to the construction of underground
storage facilities.144 “Thus, if a gas company is unable to directly
contract with property owners for storage rights, it can still obtain
subsurface rights for storage by initiating condemnation procedures in
a state or federal court.”145 If a reservoir is not interstate, then
corresponding state condemnation laws must be used.
Most state statutes also provide for voluntary and involuntary
unitization procedures. While these laws are currently focused on
unitization for the purpose of mineral extraction, they could be useful
in the establishment of a reservoir for CCS operations. Under
involuntary unitization, once a certain percentage of owners in the
field agree to unitization (anywhere from fifty to eighty-five percent),
an application may be submitted to the state oil and gas or natural
resources commission, and if the application is approved, a unit is
created.146 Thereafter, the remaining property interests will be
compelled to participate in the unitized project, and are entitled to
receipt of a portion of the proceeds.
Methods for compensation for natural gas storage remain
uncertain. This issue was explored in depth in Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement.147 The
143. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006).
144. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10122 (citing Columbia Gas Transmission
Corp. v. Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1985); Steven D. McGrew,
Selected Issues in Federal Condemnations for Underground Natural Gas Storage Rights:
Valuation Methods, Inverse Condemnation, and Trespass, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 131, 138–40
(2000)).
145. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10122.
146. Id. at 10119 (citing U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY
POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES 234 (1978)).
147. Id. at 10122 (citing Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d at 128).
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Sixth Circuit’s analysis suggested that an award of “fair market value”
could be based on any of the following methods:
comparable sales of easements for natural gas in the particular
formation; present value calculation (if sufficient natural gas exists
for commercial recovery) of the “foreseeable net income flow from
the property for its foreseeable life”; capitalization of rental income
for the right to store gas, calculated by multiplying the area to be
rented with the value of comparable storage rights; calculation of
the depreciation of the entire tract from the taking of the easement
used for storage; calculating the difference of the market value of
the property before and after the taking; mineral lease value, and
viewpoint value, i.e. the value calculated from the point of view of
148
the landowner.

While this case served to clarify the method of awarding fair market
value for natural gas storage in subsurface formations in Ohio, the
law of valuation remains unclear in most states and is largely
undecided.149
b. Spectrum of Property Rights at Issue
As evidenced by the above discussion, the property rights at
issue for any CCS project will depend upon both the geologic
formation in which the CO2 is injected, as well as the state law
governing the particular type of formation. Any legal and regulatory
framework for the promotion of CCS would have to take into
account, at a minimum, the following property interests.
(1) Ownership of subsurface rights
a. Storage in oil and gas reservoirs
b. Storage in saline aquifers (separate legal regime)
c. Storage in sub-seabed formations
d. Pore space ownership issues
e. Trespass and liability issues
(2) Ownership of surface rights
a. Pore space ownership issues (overlap with subsurface
rights)
b. Access and construction of facilities
(3) Severed Estate Issues
a. Lessees of solid minerals
b. Oil and gas lessees
c. Owners of non-operating interests
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id.
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d. Owners of future interests
e. Rights of adjacent property owners
(4) Condemnation and unitization
a. Condemnation
b. Voluntary unitization
c. Compulsory unitization
(5) Short-term ownership and liability issues
(6) Long-term ownership and liability issues
B. How Comprehensive Federal Legislation Should Deal with
Ownership Issues
Due to the spectrum of property interests at issue, the diversity
of treatment of these interests between the states and the reliance
upon the states of these regimes governing existing CO2 injection
sites, federal law should not completely preempt this area of state
property law as part of any comprehensive CCS federal legislation.
Of particular concern is the risk of takings claims from each of these
diverse property interests if federal law were to preempt in this area.
Also of concern is the large extent of well-developed state property
law that would be preempted through federal legislation, and how
this preemptive legislation would interact with non-preempted state
property law.
Furthermore, the IOGCC Task Force report, which has been
widely cited by commentators, specifically recommends that “given
the jurisdiction, experience, and expertise of states and provinces in
the regulation of oil and natural gas production and natural gas
storage in the United States and Canada, the states and provinces
would be the most logical and experienced regulators of the geologic
storage of carbon dioxide.”150 In keeping with this recommendation,
the Task Force further recommended that rather than imposing a
legal property framework on the states for the promotion of CCS
technology, “control of the necessary storage rights should be
required as part of the initial [Geological Storage Unit (GSU)] site
licensing to promote orderly development and maximize utilization of
the GSU,” thus essentially leaving the question of site ownership to
established state law.151

150. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 3.
151. Id. at 27.
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Rather than completely preempting this area of property law,
federal legislation could include limited federal statutory authority for
certain key elements and propose a type of model state legislation
that could be adopted by states with less developed or unclear rules in
order to better facilitate the proposed federal scheme. Such a model
state legislation could be based on the more robust property regimes
of the states that have examined this area. This preserves existing
state law, but ensures that CCS operators in states without developed
law would have a guide or proposal for moving ahead. An example
of model legislation is provided in the Appendix. It addresses a
number of factors that are of particular concern to subsurface
property rights and should help to facilitate CCS deployment,
including ownership of subsurface pore space and impacts on surface
and mineral estates, state condemnation provisions, a post-closure
ownership scheme, and unitization procedures.152
Federal legislation could address some aspects of CCS without
preempting state law. Federal legislation should provide that no
sequestration project may be permitted without ownership of all
necessary property rights. If an operator could not secure all
necessary property rights after legitimate and fair negotiations,
federal legislation could further provide for condemnation
proceedings for interstate projects modeled after the Natural Gas Act
153
Under this statute, if eminent domain powers are
of 1938.
exercised, the federal legislation provides for compensation of the
property owner at fair market value.154 The EPA, as the proposed
CCS regulatory agency, could promulgate regulations establishing the
method for determination of fair market value.
Federal legislation should also clearly provide that any right of
eminent domain granted pursuant to the statute will not prejudice the
owners of the land to other uses of the property not acquired for the
storage facility. A similar condemnation procedure for intra-state
155
reservoirs is also provided for in the model state statute.
With a proposed liability scheme, federal legislation could also
adopt a long-term ownership transfer and release of liability scheme
that should help address concerns about long-term storage liability
issues that are inherent to CCS. Under the laws governing natural
152. This statutory language borrows heavily from similar statutes recently passed in
Wyoming. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-152, 34-1-202, 30-5-501, 35-11-313 (2008).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006).
154. Id.
155. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, app. 1.
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gas storage, it is apparent that the injecting operator will retain
ownership rights of the injected carbon dioxide, even if it were to
migrate outside the designated receiving reservoir. This retention of
ownership raises important issues regarding long-term monitoring
and liability for the stored CO2. Commentators have noted that the
only entities that are likely equipped to reliably handle the long-term
storage requirements of carbon dioxide are state and federal
governments.156
Given these issues, federal legislation should adopt the postclosure property transfer and release of liability provisions (in
primary part) proposed by the IOGCC Task Force in their 2007
report on Storage of Carbon Dioxide in Geologic Structures, to the
extent it is consistent with overall provisions on liability. The Task
Force, which was sponsored by the Department of Energy, included
members from the IOGCC, state agencies, federal agencies from both
the United States and Canada, industry representatives, academic and
professional representatives, and environmental advocates. This
diverse membership suggested a framework for long-term liability
and property ownership that appears to be a workable solution for
the promotion of CCS technology. The primary components are
summarized as follows:
Closure is proposed to be divided into a Closure Period and
Post-Closure Period. The Closure Period is defined as that period
of time when the plugging of the injection wells (excluding wells to
be used as observation wells as agreed upon between the [CO2
Storage Project (CSP)] Operator and the [State Regulatory
Agency]) is completed and continuing until a future date is
reached, defined as some period of time (10 or 29 years, etc.) after
injection activities and the injection wells are plugged. During this
Closure Period, the operator of the CSP would be the responsible
party and be required to maintain the CSP operational bond and
individual or blanket well bonds specified in Section 4. The
individual well bonds will be released as the wells are plugged. At
the conclusion of the Closure Period, the operational bond would
be released and the liability for ensuring that the CSP remains a
secure storage site during the Post-Closure Period would transfer to
the state.
During the Post-Closure Period the financial resources
necessary for the state or a state contracted entity to engage in
future monitoring, verification, and remediation activities would be
157
provided by a state-administered trust fund.

156. INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 23.
157. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 29.
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The IOGCC scheme could be modified somewhat to conform to
other liability elements in federal legislation. For example, during the
Post-Closure Period, ownership could transfer to the United States,
instead of a state, under a comprehensive liability scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction, liability, and property rights are not the only issues
that must be addressed in a comprehensive CCS statutory scheme.
Other regulatory barriers need to be addressed as well. For instance,
what regimes should govern Tribal Lands managed in the Federal
Indian Trust System for which states may not have the right to
regulate minerals?158 Sequestering CO2 offshore is also a viable
economic option for CCS. But since offshore sequestration involves
different jurisdictional issues, those must be addressed as well. Last,
the potential for other state and federal laws to impede deployment
of CCS must be examined as well. Many policy decisions would need
to be addressed and the Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources Center at the University of Houston Law Center has
attempted to address some of them through its research and draft
legislative proposal for comprehensive CCS legislation.
There are genuine differences in how the policy questions of
liability burden and property rights should be addressed. The
approach taken in this article is not the only one. However, it is clear
that there are serious regulatory questions that must be addressed to
reduce the uncertainties facing those who would be the first adopters
of CCS. Because of the importance of CCS to reducing GHG
emissions, this statutory undertaking should be one of President
Obama’s most important natural resource priorities.

158. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 796
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Bureau of Land Management may preclude states from
managing mineral resources on Indian Trust land).
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APPENDIX
MODEL STATE/TRIBAL LEGISLATION
SECTION 1: OWNERSHIP OF PORE SPACE
Subchapter I.
As used in this section, the term “pore space”
is defined to mean subsurface space which can be used as storage
space for carbon dioxide or other substances.
Subchapter II.
The ownership of all pore space below surface
lands and waters of the state is declared to be vested in the owner of
the surface estate.
Subchapter III. A conveyance of the surface estate shall be a
conveyance of the pore space in all strata below the surface of such
real property unless the ownership interest in such pore space
previously has been severed from the surface ownership or is
explicitly excluded in the conveyance.
Subchapter IV. The ownership of pore space in strata may be
conveyed in any manner provided by law for the transfer of mineral
interests in real property. No agreement conveying mineral or other
interests underlying the surface estate shall act to convey ownership
of any pore space unless the agreement explicitly conveys that
ownership interest.
Subchapter V.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
change or alter the state or common law as it relates to the rights
belonging to, or the dominance of, the mineral estate.
Subchapter VI. All instruments which transfer the rights to
pore space under this section shall describe the scope of any right to
use the surface estate. The owner of any pore space right shall have
no right to use the surface estate beyond that set out in a properly
recorded instrument.
Subchapter VII. Transfers of pore space rights made after
_________________ (date of enactment) are null and void at the
option of the owner of the surface estate if the transfer instrument
does not contain a specific description of the location of the pore
space being transferred. The description may include, but is not
limited to, a subsurface geologic or seismic survey or a metes and
bounds description of the surface lying over the transferred pore
space. In the event a description of the surface is used, the transfer
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shall be deemed to include pore space at all depths underlying the
described surface area unless specifically excluded. The validity of
pore space rights under this paragraph shall not affect the respective
liabilities of any party, and such liabilities shall operate in the same
manner as if the pore space transfer were valid.
Subchapter VIII. Nothing in this section shall alter, amend,
diminish or invalidate rights to the use of subsurface pore space that
were acquired by contract or lease prior to ___________ (date of
enactment).
Subchapter IX. It is the intent of the legislature to clarify the
ownership of pore space underlying the surface of the lands and
waters of this state. All conveyances of interests in real property on
and after __________________ (date of enactment) shall be subject to
the provisions of this Act. All conveyances of real property made
prior to ___________________ (date of enactment) shall be construed
in accordance with the provisions of this act unless a person claiming
an ownership interest contrary to the provisions of this act establishes
such ownership by a preponderance of the evidence in an action to
establish ownership of such interest.
SECTION 2: EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY
(a) When any owner or operator of a sequestration project that
has been licensed in accordance with the Act, cannot acquire by
contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property as to the
compensation to be paid, all surface and subsurface property rights
and interests necessary for construction and operation of the
sequestration project, including, but not limited to, all necessary
rights-of-way to construct, operate and maintain all pipelines,
compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or
necessary equipment or facilities, the owner or operator may acquire
the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the state
courts.
(b) Owners of property subject to eminent domain authority
shall be compensated at fair market value. The State environmental
regulatory agency may promulgate regulations establishing the
method for determination of fair market value.
(c) The right of eminent domain granted in this section shall not
prejudice the rights of the owners of said land or other rights or
interests therein as to all other uses not acquired for the storage
facility.
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SECTION 3: UNITIZATION
(a) The State Regulatory Agency, upon its own motion, or upon
the petition by any interested party, shall conduct a hearing to
consider the need for the operation as a unit of an entire pool or any
portion thereof, in order to facilitate the use of the pore space for the
storage of carbon dioxide or other substances.
(b) The State Regulatory Agency shall issue an order requiring
unit operations, if it finds that:
1. Operation of the pool or any portion thereof is necessary
to prevent waste, to facilitate use of the pore space for carbon dioxide
or other substances, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, and to
protect the correlative rights of the property owners;
2. The unit operation of the pool or any portion thereof is
reasonably necessary in order to carry on proper development,
maintenance or other operations.
(c) The order issued by the State Regulatory Agency shall be
upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable for unit
operations and shall include:
1. A description of the pool or portion thereof, to be so
operated, termed the unit area;
2. A statement of the nature of the operations
contemplated;
3. A just and reasonable allocation to the separately owned
tracts in the unit area for the injection of all carbon dioxide or other
substances into the unit area;
4. A provision for the credits and charges to be made in the
adjustment among the owners in the unit area for their interest in
wells, tanks, pumps, machinery, materials, and equipment contributed
to the unit operations;
5. The time when the unit operations shall commence, and
the manner in which, and the circumstances under which, the unit
operations and the unit shall terminate and be dissolved;
6. Such additional provisions that are found to be
appropriate for carrying on the unit operations, and for the
prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights.
(d) General Provisions:
1. The State Regulatory Agency may approve additions to
the unit portions of pools not previously included within the unit and
may extend the unit area as necessary. The State Regulatory Agency
may approve reductions to the unit area as necessary. An order
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adding to or deleting from the unit area shall be upon terms that are
just and reasonable.
2. A property owner not included in the original unit may
petition for inclusion into the unit area.
3. All operations, including, but not limited to, the
commencement, drilling, or operation of a site upon any portion of
the unit area shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such
operations upon each separately owned tract in the unit area by the
several owners thereof.
4. The State Regulatory Agency, upon its own motion, or
upon the petition by any owner, may for good cause terminate unit
operations and dissolve the unit.
SECTION 4: TRUST FUND, LIABILITY RELEASE, AND TRANSFER OF
OWNERSHIP
(a) Establishment of Trust Fund. There is hereby established a
Carbon Dioxide Storage Facility Trust Fund to be administered by
the State Regulatory Agency. There is hereby levied on the Owner
or Operator a fee equal to ____ for each ton of carbon dioxide
injected for storage for the purposes of funding the Carbon Dioxide
Geologic Storage Trust Fund. The Trust Fund shall be utilized solely
for the long-term monitoring and maintenance of the site and storage
facility, including, but not limited to, maintenance and monitoring of
remaining surface facilities and wells, remediation of mechanical
problems associated with remaining wells and surface infrastructure,
repairing mechanical leaks at the site, and plugging and abandoning
remaining wells under the jurisdiction of the State Regulatory
Agency for use as observation wells. The Trust Fund shall be
administered by the Administrator.
(b) Liability Release/Transfer of Ownership. Ten years, or some
other timeframe as established by rule, after cessation of operations,
the State Regulatory Agency shall issue a Certificate of Completion
of Injection Operations, upon a showing by the Owner or Operator
that the reservoir is reasonably expected to retain mechanical
integrity and remain emplaced, at which time ownership to the
remaining project, including the stored carbon dioxide, transfers to
the State.
(c) Upon issuance of the Certificate of Completion of Injection
Operations, the owner or operator, and all generators of any injected
carbon dioxide, shall be released from all further liability associated
with the project. This section shall have no impact on the
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Compensation Fund and associated regulations, which Fund will
remain in effect at all times regardless of ownership of the pore space
and stored carbon dioxide.

